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Drivers and persistence of death in conflicts: global evidence 
 
 






We investigate persistence and determinants of deaths from conflicts in a sample of 163 
countries for the period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised 
Method of Moments. First, the findings are contingent on income levels, religious-
domination, landlockedness, regional proximity and legal origins. The persistence of deaths in 
internal conflict is more apparent in coastal, French civil-law and Islam-oriented countries, 
compared to landlocked, English common law, Christian-oriented countries, respectively.  
Second, the following factors are generally responsible for driving deaths from internal 
conflicts: homicides, conflict intensity and conflicts fought. Furthermore, incarcerations have 
negative effects on internal conflicts. Justifications for the established tendencies and policy 
implications are discussed.   
 
JEL Classification: H56; L64; K42; P50 




Three main tendencies in scholarly and academic circles constitute the premise of this paper, 
notably: the growing cost of conflicts in the world; the policy relevance of elucidating the 
causes of deaths from conflicts and gaps in the literature. The points are substantiated in 
chronological order.  
 First, conflict-related negative externalities (including death) are increasingly a global 
concern. This fact is sustained by the 2015 Global Peace Index (GPI) report which maintains 
that about 13% of the annual wealth produced in the world is allocated to tackle conflict-
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related issues (Anderson, 2015a; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017). To put this point into 
greater perspective, this annual wealth is equivalent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
the following countries: Spain, France, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany.  
Given these sober stylized facts, the significant amount of wealth that is spent on managing 
deaths from conflicts could otherwise have been used to fund socio-economic projects related 
to sustainable development goals. This narrative is broadly consistent with contemporary and 
non-contemporary literature on what it takes to resolve conflicts and promote peace (Bodine 
& Crawford, 1998; Lenski, 2014; Malhotra, 2016; Rubenstein, 2017).  
 Second, building on the above, it is policy-relevant to understand drivers of internal 
and external conflicts in the world. Accordingly, understanding these drivers is important 
given that they could be leveraged upon to potentially prevent conflicts and the corresponding 
costs associated with deaths. Moreover, mitigating, avoiding and preventing such “deaths in 
conflicts” would logically have positive socio-economic externalities on society as a whole.   
 Third, from a scholarly viewpoint, this study is relevant because of the sparse 
scholarly literature on drivers of deaths from conflicts around the world.   To the best of our 
knowledge, while there are studies on trends and patterns in battle deaths, the extant literature 
on drivers of deaths in conflicts around the world has not focused on persistence using more 
contemporary data. For instance, Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) engage patterns and trends in 
deaths from battles using a new dataset made available to the scientific community. Murray et 
al. (2002) have focused on deaths from conflicts within the framework that conflicts are 
understood as an issue of public health. Obermeyer et al. (2008) on their part, take into 
account “50 years of violent war deaths” in their study on Vietnam to Bosnia which builds on 
an analysis of data from the world health survey programme. Lacina (2006) views the 
“severity of civil wars” in the light of the number of deaths that are registered in civil wars 
while Lacina et al. (2006) have argued for a “declining risk of death in battle”. The impact of 
conflicts on adult mortality using a time series cross-national analysis is examined by Li and 
Wen (2005). More studies in the literature on factors affecting conflicts is summarised in 
Table 1.  
In order to increase options for policy implications, the empirical analysis places some 
emphasis on a multitude of comparative fundamentals. To this end, the dataset is decomposed 
into fundamental characteristics contingent on legal origins, income levels, religious 
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domination, landlockedness and regional proximity1. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows.  The stylized facts, theoretical underpinnings and related literature are disclosed in 
Section 2. Section 3 presents the data and methodology while the empirical results and 
corresponding discussion are covered in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 with 
implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Stylized facts, theoretical underpinnings, literature review and comparative 
characteristics  
2.1 Some stylize facts  
This section is discussed in five main strands with particular emphasis on major 
conflicts in the regions across world, namely: sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East and 
North Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. The discussion on conflicts in these 
regions is expanded in the same chronology as highlighted.  
First, SSA is experiencing substantial deaths from conflicts, partly because of 
increased levels of terrorism, partly because of its contemporary history of political strife and 
civil wars (Kossele & Shan, 2018; Kossele, 2020). (i) From the former perspective, among the 
terrorists’ organisations inflicting casualties in SSA, the Boko Haram of Nigeria is the most 
prolific. The organisation has extended its activities to neighboring countries like Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger.   To put this point into more perspective, in 2014, the Boko Haram was 
responsible for 6,664 deaths compared to 6074 from ISIL (Searcey & Santora, 2015).  The 
following are other complementary insights that could be driving the persistence of deaths 
from conflicts in the continent in 2014:  (i) South Sudan’s civil war between the Dinkas and 
Nuers caused 1, 817 deaths and (ii) the al-Shabaab was responsible for 4,425 deaths, 
including 633 civilians (Anderson, 2015b; Asongu et al., 2018a, 2018b).  
(ii) With regard to the view of conflicts, in the contemporary era, SSA has been characterized 
by more political instability and violence, compared to other regions of the world. Though 
some of these conflicts are not in the sampled periodicity, there are recurrent pockets of 
political unrest across the region. The relative importance of SSA in political instability and 
violence is summarized by Asongu (2014b): “seven of the nine cases of total chaos and 
                                                             
1 Another strand of the literature that has used the same dataset but has focused on different problem statements 
includes studies focusing on: the persistence of terrorism (Asongu, 2020) and incarcerations (Asongu, 2019); 
persistence of weapons (Asongu, Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2020a); contemporary drivers of global tourism 
(Asongu, Nnanna, Biekpe & Acha-Anyi, 2019); the right to life (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2019) and the murder 
or homicide epidemic (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2019a). This study departs from the attendant studies by focusing 
on drivers and persistence of death in conflicts around the world.  
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societal breakdowns known in recent history have been registered in Africa (with the 
exceptions of Afghanistan and Syria): Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zaire/Congo, 
Somalia, and Sudan” (p.1569). Moreover, recently the internal conflicts in South Sudan 
(Justin & de Vries, 2019; Krause, 2019) and the Western part of Cameroon (Keke, 2020; 
Mbih, 2020; Nganji & Cockburn, 2020) are indicative of the fact the internal conflicts remain 
a critical setback to economic development in SSA. 
Second, conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa can be discussed in various 
streams pertaining to inter alia: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; concerns surrounding Iranian 
nuclear weapons program; the Iraqi political stalemate; the proxy war in Yemen and the 
Syrian conflict. These underlying various streams are discussed in the same chronology as 
highlighted. (i) The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of the oldest conflicts that have 
consistently resulted in deaths over the past 70 years (Ben-Meir, 2020). The issue is 
fundamentally based on the inability of either country to acknowledge the rights of the other 
country to the same piece of land (Pressman, 2019; Muller, 2019). Consequently, this has led 
to endless violence between Palestinians and Israelis and resolving the conflict would require 
courageous and visionary leaders that are prepared to make concessions for the peaceful co-
existence of both countries on the same piece of land.   
(ii) Concerns surrounding the Iranian nuclear weapons program began in the aftermath of the 
Iranian revolution in 1979; an era during which Iran sought to lead the region by becoming a 
nuclear power (Ben-Meir, 2020). According to the narrative, ramifications of Iran’s quest to 
become a regional superpower include the complicity of the country in conflicts that are 
affecting political instability in neighboring countries, namely, in: Syria, Iraq, Yemen and 
Lebanon. The USA recently withdrew from a deal meant to contain Iran’s nuclear weapons 
agenda and this has encouraged Iran to continue on her path to becoming a nuclear power in 
the region (Laipson, 2019; Pieper, 2019), in spite of crippling sanctions from the USA. 
Moreover, the recent assassination of general Soleimani (i.e. an Iranian general) in Iraq by the 
USA has increased tensions in the region because many are concerned that the US-Iranian 
strife could escalate (Singh, 2020).  
 
(iii) The Iraq war of 2003 still continues to have repercussions on peace and stability in the 
Middle East today. Even prior to the 2003 war led by the USA, Iraq upon its establishment in 
1932 has experienced many waves of political strife and turbulence, notably: the 1958 
revolution, the assumption of power by Saddam Hussein in 1979 which engendered the Gulf 
and Iran-Iraq wars and recently the 2003 war that has led to more than 100 000 deaths and 
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substantially damaged infrastructure (Ben-Meir, 2020). Moreover, cross boarder conflicts and 
request for more autonomy by some regions of the country have led to recurrent conflicts in 
the contemporary era (Zarei, 2020; Akdedian & Hasan, 2020).  
 
(iv)The Yemeni war is considered by most analysts as one of the most horrific human 
disasters in modern history, not least because it is proxy war involving, inter alia, two 
countries also fighting to become regional superpowers, namely: Iran and Saudi Arabia (Ben-
Meir, 2020). While Iran is backing the leader of Shite Muslims through Houthi rebels, Saudi 
Arabia is supporting an internationally recognized government that is led by Sunni Muslims 
(Darwich, 2020). The ongoing war has led to over one million children sick of cholera, 
thousands of deaths and millions left to starve, with many dying of starvation (Blackburn et 
al., 2020; Ben-Meir, 2020).  
(v) Despite the fact that the Syrian government now has an upper hand in the Syrian conflict, 
the underlying conflict is one of the deadly externalities of the Arab Spring which has had 
very devastating consequences both in terms of the number of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (i.e. over 11 million) as well as the number of people killed as a result of 
the war (i.e. about 700 000 people) (Ben-Meir,  2020; David et al., 2020). In spite of some 
evidence that a proxy war is also being fought in the country between the USA, Turkey, 
Russia and Iran, it is apparent that President Assad is increasingly restoring his authority 
across the country (Walther & Perdersen, 2020). However, until external forces leave the 
country and the rebels surrender, the conflict is less likely to stop abruptly.  
 Third, in Latin America, the persistence in deaths from internal conflicts can be 
fundamentally traceable to the high rate of homicides in the region. For instance, according to 
Muggah and de Carvalho (2017), a youth in Latin America is murdered every fifteen minutes. 
The continent has registered approximately 2.5 million citizens since the beginning of the 
third millennium. There are seven countries that account for approximately a quarter of 
annual deaths in the world, namely: Venezuela, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Colombia and Brazil. It is important to note that Latin America is host to 23 of the 25 most 
murderous cities and 44 of the 50 most homicidal countries. 
 Fourth, the most notable contemporary crisis in Europe is the Ukraine crisis which has 
been a power struggle between two factions in the country. While one of the factions is 
aligned with Russia, the other is supported by the European Union (Amadeo, 2020). It is 
important to note that Ukraine was a crucial contributor to the economy of the Soviet Union 
between 1920 and 1991. However, following a political crisis in the country between 2014 
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and 2018, there was a military conflict between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian 
soldiers.  
A possible reason for an anticipated low persistence of death from conflicts in Europe 
is because of its comparatively high capacity to resolve concerns surrounding internal 
conflicts. For instance, while only 20% of murders are solved in the Latin American 
continent, approximately 80% of homicides are resolved in European countries (Muggah & de 
Carvalho, 2017). This comparative ability to address conflicting scenarios may be 
fundamentally traceable to the peoples’ believe in government institutions for the resolution 
of conflicts. Accordingly, people often resort to conflicts as means of making their voices 
heard in the absence of a stringent rule  of law (Choi, 2010) and good governance (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017d).  
 Fifth, in Asia, inter alia (i.e. Myanmar crisis, Kashmir issue, Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka, 
Sikh Minority in Pakistan), the most notable contemporary crisis over the past decade have 
been the crackdown of the Rohingya Muslims by Myanmar's army which has led to hundreds 
of thousands of Rohingya Muslims fleeing into Bangladesh across the border. The crackdown 
which began in August 2017 has been considered by the United Nations as a “textbook 
example of ethnic cleansing” (BBC, 2020; Druce, 2020). According to the narrative, as of 
January 2020, a top court at the United Nations ordered that measures should be taken by the 
Buddhist-majority of the country in order to protect Rohingya community members from 
genocide. While some measures are being taken by the government, the army of the country is 
still denying allegations of genocide by arguing that they are targeting Rohingya militants and 
not civilians (Islam, 2020).  
 
2.2. Theoretical underpinnings and literature review  
The theoretical framework of persistence has underpinned a bulk of the literature, 
notably in: inclusive development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a) and financial development 
(Stephan & Tsapin, 2008; Goddard et al., 2011). In addition, the theoretical insights build on 
studies focusing on income level convergence which constitute a substantial part of 
neoclassical growth models (Barro, 1991; Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995;  Mankiw et 
al., 1992;  Baumol, 1986). These theoretical insights are increasingly being transplanted to 
other development areas, namely: the development of stock markets (Asongu, 2013; Bruno et 
al., 2012; Narayan et al., 2011) and non-exclusive human progress (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; 
Asongu, 2014a).  
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 It is worthwhile to lay emphasis on the fact that novel theories of economic growth 
were proposed and developed in the area of post-Keynesianism. The theoretical inquiries 
became relevant principally as a result of remarkable improvements in the neoclassical 
revolution that led to a considerable shift in income differences across nations. Under this 
theoretical canopy, concepts of market equilibrium were developed to emphasis the 
importance of theories of economic growth which predicted absolute decreases in income 
levels across countries. Consistent with Mayer-Foulkes (2010), successful convergence trends 
are fundamentally traceable to positive externalities from “free market competition”.  There 
are two main strands in the attendant literature. There is a strand which argues that only 
divergence (i.e. lack of convergence) is feasible because of, inter alia: disparities in initial 
conditions, the presence of multiple equilibria and multiple endowments (Barro, 1991; 
Pritchett, 1997). There is another strand of theoretical literature which is of the position that, 
in spite of heterogeneities in initial conditions, cross-country variations in levels of income 
are feasible, especially when countries converge to a steady state or long-run equilibria 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).   
 The purpose of this study is not to take positions for or against any of the contending 
schools of thought. What is relevant for our study is a common denominator, notably: the 
criterion used to assess and conclude on the presence or absence of convergence. The 
common criterion applied in this study is that for convergence to be established, the   
estimated lagged dependent variable should be with the interval of zero and one.   
Table 1 summarizes some extant literature on factors driving or deterring conflicts 
across the world. It is important to note that we are briefly discussing this strand of the 
literature because to the best of our knowledge and as substantiated in the introduction, while 
there are extant studies on patterns and trends in deaths from battles, scholarship on the 
persistence and drivers of death in conflicts using more contemporary global data is sparse.  
Hence, the added value of this study is to complement the existing literature by using more 
contemporary world data and focusing on deaths as a specific outcome of conflicts, namely: 










Table 1: Factors affecting Conflicts  
Author(s) Period Countries/Others Methodology Conflicts Instruments  Results  
       
Costa et al. 
(2008) 
Undisclosed Two groups of 100 
participants  
Error analysis  conflicting 
information 
 
Bilingualism  Resolves  
conflicting 
information 
       
Gubler & Selway 
(2012) 
1945-1999 159 countries  logit model Civil wars Societies where 
ethnicity is cross cut 
by socioeconomic 
class, geographic 
region and religion 
civil war onset 





       
Jo & Namgung, 
(2012) 








are more likely 
to engage 
DSMs 




1990-2008 African countries 
with civil wars 
Cox proportional 
hazards model 
Civil wars in 
Africa 
private military 




PMCs are in 
competition  
       
Brancati & 
Snyder (2013) 
1945-2008 Post World War II 














       
Adhikari et al. 
(2012) 
1996-2006 Nepal Pobit analysis Civil war understanding loss 
and risk factors 
redress of war 
grievances 
       
Walter (2015) 1945-2009 Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) 
Armed Conflict 
Database (ACD) 





Models and Fixed 
effects models  
Inter-state 
conflicts  
Political institutions  Strong political 
institutions 
mitigate war in 
post-conflict 
societies.  








Catch-up in negative 
signals like  
inflation, 
unemployment and 
bad governance  













lifelong learning  
Instruments 
favour political 
stability   




2009-2010 38 African countries  OLS  Conflicts and 
crimes  
Six good governance 
tools  
Corruption-
control is the 
best tool 
       
MENA: Middle East & North Africa. GMM: Generalised Methods of Moments. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.  
 
In what follows, we briefly discuss studies summarised in the table. Building on the 
curiosity that the imperative of bilinguals to continuously employ two languages during a 
speech could affect their networks of attention, Costa et al. (2008) have explored the concern 
by comparing the performance of monolinguals and bilinguals in a previously developed 
attentional network task. Under the premise that the underlying task is supposed to build on 
three principal attentional networks (executive control, orienting and alerting), the findings 
show that participants with a bilingual culture were faster at task performance on the one hand 
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and on the other, more efficient when it came to executive alerting and executive control 
networks.  Moreover, bilinguals were not only better at resolving conflicting information, but 
could also leverage more on an alerting cue. In addition, reduced switching cost between a 
multitude of trials was experienced by bilinguals when compared with monolinguals.  
Bilingualism is also established to exert some influence on the young adults’ abilities to attain 
efficient attentional channels, notably young individuals who are supposed to be at the apogee 
of their attentional capabilities.  
 Using a data set on Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) between 1957 and 2008 to 
assess what factors determine the legal arrangements of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
(DSMs),  Jo and Namgung (2012) have established three main findings, notably:  (i) it is more 
likely for democracies to prefer DSMs that are moderately strict, when compared with 
autocracies; (ii) similar templates are increasingly adopted by each trading partner in their 
attempt to emulate each other and (iii) recent evidence of legalistic channels  substantially 
build on the development of trade regimes that are multilateral. By highlighting the relevance 
of both macro-level and member-specific factors, the results have valuable implications for 
the conception of international institutions.  
 Gubler and Selway (2012) present a comprehensive theory of civil war onset and 
ethnic structure based on ethnic groups, geographic dispersion and horizontal inequality. 
According to the authors, the mobilization efforts of rebel leaders are thwarted in societies 
with highly cross-cutting tendencies. This is essentially because of inter alia: lower possibility 
of potential combatants to identify with nationalist ambitions, reduced communication in 
groups and limited ability to manifest social control. Building on a cross-national sample of 
more than 100 nations, the authors conclude that, on average the onset of a civil war is about 
twelve times less likely in environments where ethnicity is influenced by religion, geographic 
region and socioeconomic class.  
Adhikari et al. (2012) have used data in Nepal to assess the demand for post-conflict 
reparations by individuals. The authors conclude that the understanding of risk and loss 
features is imperative in civil reconciliation and settlement. Brancati and Snyder (2013) have 
argued that when elections are held immediately following a civil war, it could increase the 
possibility of renewed fighting. Moreover, the authors conclude that the following conditions 
can mitigate risks, namely: peacekeeping, demobilization, power sharing, decisive victories 
and strong institutions (judicial, administrative and political).  Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 
(2016) analyse the role of governance tools (corruption-control, rule of law, regulation 
quality, voice & accountability, government effectiveness and political stability/non violence) 
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in fighting conflicts and crimes to conclude that corruption-control is the most effective. This 
is broadly consistent with Walter (2015) who has concluded that bad governance leads to a 
repeat of war and conflict trap.  
 The effect of private military companies (PMCs) on the length of a conflict is 
investigated by Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2013) in Africa from 1990 to 2008. The 
empirical findings show that, with increasing competition in among government-hired PMCs, 
optimal service delivery is enhanced and therefore, the swift end of conflicts. Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016a) predict the occurrence of the Arab Spring in a sample of Middle East 
and North African (MENA) countries whereas Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) demonstrate 
that education and lifelong learning can be used to reduce political conflicts and violence.  
 
2. 3 Intuition for comparative development fundamentals 
This section substantiates the premise for disaggregating the sample in terms of legal origins, 
regions, religious dominations, landlockedness and income levels. These fundamental features 
of comparative economic development have been documented in comparative development 
studies (Narayan et al., 2011; Beegle et al., 2016; Mlachila et al., 2017; Asongu & le Roux, 
2017).  The above comparative features are discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
paragraphs. 
 First, consistent with the argument of Asongu et al. (2020a) that income levels 
elucidate the persistence of weapons and Asongu et al. (2020b), that income levels explain 
cross-country political instability and political terror, by extension, low income levels can be 
expected to be linked with higher levels of deaths from conflicts. Given that the authors argue 
that the wealth of nations explains political stability, political terrorism and persistence in 
weapons, it therefore logical for this study to also argue that income levels can explain deaths 
from conflicts because low income countries are likely to be more associated with political 
instability and conflicts owing to their limited financial resources needed to prevent conflicts 
as well as their corresponding negative externalities which include death from conflicts and 
political stability. The underlying arguments have been employed in contemporary studies to 
justify why foreign aid flows from developed to developing countries in order to mitigate the 
negative externalities of terrorism that are more apparent in the latter set of countries (Asongu 
& Kodila-Tedika, 2017;  Efobi et al., 2015).  
 Second, as documented in Arvis et al. (2017) and Asongu and le Roux (2017), 
landlockedness is closely associated with institutional and socio-economic costs which are 
more likely to spark political conflicts according to Asongu et al. (2020b). This extension is 
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based on the fact that political instability is among the attendant institutional costs. Hence, it 
follows that coastal countries should be linked with less persistence in deaths in conflicts, 
compared to landlocked countries.  
 Third, as argued in contemporary comparative literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2017b), owing to the liberal nature of Christian-oriented countries relative to their Islam-
related counterparts which are comparatively more conservative, Christian-related countries  
are likely to be more linked to civil unrests and political terror since, citizens in such countries 
are liberal in the rights to express their grievances. This argument is broadly supported by Li 
(2005) who has posited that institutions that are democratic do provide an enabling 
environment for citizens that are aggrieved to employ mechanisms (that may lead to political 
instability) as means to resolving the corresponding conflicts. Conflicts naturally engender 
deaths which are captured by the outcome variables used in the study. In essence, according to 
the narrative, compared to less liberal nations (which are mostly Islam-oriented countries), 
that are largely characterized as stable autocracies, more deaths owing to political instability 
could be related to unstable democracies because they do less to curtail ex-ante violence. In 
essence, compared to failed democracies, deaths from conflicts could be less linked to stable 
autocracies because such stable autocracies are more able to prevent political instability 
(Schmid, 1992; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Piazza, 2017, 2018; Lai, 
2007; Asongu et al., 2020a, 2020b). In summary, the nexus between religion and deaths from 
conflicts, owing to political instability is elicited in this paragraph using both intuition and the 
relevant studies. 
 Fourth, building on the law and economic development literature (La Porta et al., 
1998, 1999; Beck et al., 2013; Agbor, 2015), legal origins influence political 
instability/violence and corresponding deaths from conflicts owing to political and 
adaptability frameworks. French civil law countries are more likely to be associated with 
deaths conflicts from because the post-independence politico-economic structure left by their 
former colonial power (i.e. France) entails the substantial presence of the former colonial 
power (i.e. France’s influence). For instance, in addition to France having a tight control on 
the currency used by most of her former colonies in Africa, as of 2014, compared to countries 
with English common law, French civil law countries (almost all of which are former colonies 
of France) had registered substantially more coup d’états with the help of France; most of the 
coup d’états subsequently led to conflicts and deaths from conflicts (Koutonin, 2014). 
 Fifth, regarding income levels, high income nations are less associated with 
persistence in deaths from conflicts because they are less linked to political instability, civil 
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wars, political strife and violence (Asongu et al., 2020a). Moreover, even in event of political 
instability and terror, high income countries have the financial resources with which to 
dampen the unfavourable political externalities that such as loss in human life (Gaibulloev & 
Sandler, 2009; Asongu et al., 2020b). This narrative aligns with the premise that high income 
countries are associated with better institutions with which to mitigate risks that inter alia, are 
linked to deaths from civil wars and political strife (Asongu, 2012; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 
2014; Efobi, 2015; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016, 2018; Pelizzo  et al., 2016; Asongu & Nnanna, 
2019a). Note should be taken of the fact that the argument of income levels and regions can 
be valid in respect of employing them as fundamental characteristics of comparative 
development because: (i) in regions that mostly consist of high income nations, not all 
corresponding countries are high income nations and (ii) in regions that consists of mostly 
countries with low income, some higher income countries are also apparent.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
This paper investigates a sample of one hundred and sixty-three countries for the period 2010 
to 2015. The data is obtained from a multitude of sources, namely: the Operations of Criminal 
Justice Systems (CTS); Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; the United Nations Committee on 
Contributions; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime 
Trends and a Qualitative assessment by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ 
estimates. The choice of the periodicity has been motivated by the need to have findings with 
more updated policy implications. A strand of studies that has used the same dataset has 
focused on: determinants of access to weapons (Asongu & Nnanna, 2019b); contemporary 
drivers of global tourism (Asongu, Nnanna, Biekpe & Acha-Anyi, 2019) and linkages 
between military expenditure, insecurity dynamics and tourism (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2020; 
Asongu, Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2019). 
 Two outcome variables are employed, namely: deaths from external conflict and 
deaths from internal conflict. The independent variable of interest is the lagged dependent 
variable while the control variables include: security officers and police, homicides, 
incarcerations, conflict intensity, conflicts fought and the United Nations Peace Keeping 
Force (UNPKF). The variables in the conditioning information set have been documented in 
the conflicts and political instability literature (Gubler & Selway, 2012; Jo & Namgung, 2012; 
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Akcinaroglu, & Radziszewski, 2013; Adhikari et al., 2012; Walter, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2016). 
 In the light of the motivation of increasing policy implications discussed in the 
introduction, the dataset is disaggregated into fundamental features based on: (i) regions 
(North America; Latin America; South Asia; East Asia & the Pacific;  Europe & Central Asia; 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA); sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)); (ii) landlockedness 
(Landlocked and  Coastal); (iii)  religious domination (Christian with Catholic domination;  
Christian with Protestant inclination;  Christian countries in which another Christian religion 
apart from Catholicism and Protestantism is dominant; Buddhist-oriented and Islam-
dominated countries); and (iv) legal origins (French civil law, English common law, German 
civil law,  and Scandinavian civil law and Socialist countries). It is also worthwhile to 
emphasize that the fundamental features have been adopted in recent literature on 
comparative economic development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b; Mlachila et al., 2017; 
Beegle et al., 2016; Asongu & le Roux, 2017; Narayan et al., 2011;  D’Amico, 2010). In what 
follows, we discuss the information criteria used to select the highlighted fundamental 
features.  
 First, the basis for legal origins is obtained from La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). 
Whereas the categorisation by religious-domination is from the World Fact Book (CIA, 2011) 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the World Bank’s income level categorization is 
used to classify countries in terms of income levels2. Landlocked countries are directly 
apparent from a world map. Appendix 1 provides the definitions of variables and sampled 
countries while the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 provides the 
correlation matrix.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
The choice of the estimation technique is consistent with the behaviour of the dependent 
variables and characteristics of the data structure. Following recent literature on the 
persistence of macroeconomic variables, we adopt the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) as estimation strategy (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Doyle, 2017; Tchamyou, 
2019, 2020).  At least four main motivations underpin the selection of this empirical strategy. 
First of all, the number of agents is higher than the number of periods. Hence, the 
N(163)>T(6) premise is satisfied because T represents the number of years while N denotes 
                                                             
2 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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the number of countries. Second, given that the estimation approach is panel-oriented, cross-
country variations are considered in the estimations. Third, inherent biases in the difference 
estimator are corrected with the system estimator. Fourth, the technique accounts for 
endogeneity by employing instruments to address the concern of simultaneity. Furthermore, 
the control for time invariant variables also enhances the control for endogeneity because it 
accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity.  
 This study adopts the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) which has been established to better control for cross-sectional dependence and reduce 
over-identification and hence it is more efficient compared to traditional difference and 
system GMM approaches  (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Boateng et al., 2018; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; Tchamyou et al., 2019). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
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,         (2)                              
where, tiW ,  
is an indicator of the conflicts  (internal or external), in country i
 
at  period t , 0  
is a constant, 
 
X  is the vector of control variables (security officers & police; homicides, 
incarcerations, conflict intensity, conflicts fought and the United Nations Peace Keeping 
Forces (UNPKP)),   represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is one for the 
specification, t  




is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the 
error term.  
 In accordance with the extant literature, it is important to devote space to articulate the 
process of corresponding exclusion restrictions because these are essential for a robust GMM 
specification.  As far as exclusion restrictions are concerned, all explanatory variables are 
considered as suspected endogenous or predetermined variables and exclusively time 
invariant omitted indicators are considered as strictly exogenous variables. This identification 
approach is consistent with recent literature, notably: Boateng et al. (2018) and Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016d). Moreover, this identification process has been substantiated by 
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Roodman (2009b) who has argued that it is very unfeasible for years or time invariant omitted 
variables to be first-differenced endogenous3.  
 With regard to exclusion restrictions, consistent with the identification process, the 
outcome variables are influenced by the strictly exogenous indicators exclusively via the 
suggested endogenous or predetermined channels, which are explaining variables. In addition, 
for the suggested exclusion restrictions to hold, the alternative hypothesis underpinning such a 
restriction should be rejected. It is important to note that the alternative hypothesis to the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) argues for the position that the time invariant variables are 
not strictly exogenous. In other words, the null hypothesis argues that invariant indicators 
affect conflicts exclusively through the endogenous explaining channels.  
 Given the above clarifications, in the findings that are presented in Section 4, the 
assumption of exclusion restriction holds if the DHT linked to the time invariant instrumental 
variables (IV) (i.e. years, eq(diff)) is not rejected. It worthwhile to emphasize that such a 
criterion for validating exclusion restrictions is not different from the standard IV procedure 
which requires a rejection of the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test, in order for the engaged instruments to affect the dependent variable 
exclusively via the suggested channels or endogenous explaining mechanisms (Beck et al., 
2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016e). 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical findings are presented in Tables 2-5. Whereas Tables 2-3 shows findings on 
deaths from internal conflicts, deaths from external conflicts are disclosed in Tables 4-5.  The 
first table for each dependent variable category discloses findings corresponding to income 
levels, religious domination and landlockedness while second table discloses estimated results 
corresponding to regions and legal origins. The last column of all tables shows results of the 
full sample.  Four main information criteria are used to examine the validity of the GMM 
models4. Based on these criteria, models of the first-two tables pertaining to death from 
                                                             
3 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for 
predetermined variables. 
4 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
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internal conflict are overwhelmingly valid whereas corresponding models focusing on death 
from external conflicts are not valid for the most part because of post-estimation presence of 
residuals in the estimations. Hence, in the discussion that follows, we exclusively discuss 
valid findings in Tables 2-3, while the results in Tables 4-5 are presented at the end of the 
paper to avoid publication bias, especially the bias of exclusively disclosing positive, 
significant or strong results in scholarly circles (Franco et al., 1991; Rosenberg, 2005; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2017c).  
 It is important to emphasis that while the validity of models is relevant for assessing 
the significance of determinants of deaths from external conflicts, for persistence to be 
established, other complementary criteria should be met. These complementary criteria are 
consistent with recent literature from which two conditions are needed for convergence to be 
established (Fung, 2009, p. 58; Asongu, 2013, p. 192). First of all, the estimated lagged 
endogenous variable has to be statistically significant. Second, the statistically significant 
estimated lagged endogenous variable should be within the interval of zero and one.   
 It is worthwhile to emphasis why the criterion is based on the lagged endogenous 
variable is employed instead of the beta coefficient which is traditionally reported in GMM 
estimation output. When the underlying beta is reported, the criterion for convergence is that 
it should be less than zero. Alternatively, the estimated lagged dependent variable is directly 
reported, from which one is subtracted in order to obtain the underlying beta. In order to avoid 
such arithmetic concerns, we directly report the estimated lagged outcome variable and 
employ the alternative information criterion to assess convergence. This information criterion 
which requires that the absolute value corresponding to the estimated lagged outcome variable 
falls within the suggested interval (i.e. zero and one), is consistent with recent literature 
(Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a, p. 459). 
 Before we discuss the results in detail, one final (but not the least) clarification is 
essential. In the presence of more than one sample within a fundamental characteristic, in 
order to establish which sub-sample exhibits more persistence in deaths from internal 
conflicts, the sub-sample associated with a higher estimated lagged value in deaths from 
internal conflicts is acknowledged as reflecting more persistence. This is for the most part 
because; relevance in magnitude translates the importance of a comparative scope. In other 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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words, a higher magnitude implies that past values in deaths from internal conflicts more 
proportionately affect future values of death from internal conflicts.   
 The following findings can be established from Table 2. First, the deaths from internal 
conflicts are more persistent in high income countries compared to low income countries on 
the one hand and on the other hand, in middle income countries, the corresponding deaths are 
more persistent in lower middle income countries compared to their upper middle income 
counterparts. It follows that the narrative in Section 2 pertaining to cross-country differences 
based on income levels is only partially valid because it only holds when lower middle 
income countries are compared with their upper middle income counterparts. Second, in 
relation to religious domination, persistence of deaths from internal conflicts is apparent in the 
following order of increasing magnitude: Christian protestant countries, Christian catholic 
countries and Islam-dominated countries. However only the findings from Christian-catholic 
and Islam-oriented countries are used for comparative purpose because of the presence of 
instrument proliferation in the other specifications (i.e. in the post-estimation diagnostic tests, 
the number of instruments are respectively higher than the corresponding number of 
countries). The comparative tendency in cross-sections that pass the instrument proliferation 
test is not consistent with the narrative in Section 2 because of the persistence in deaths from 
conflicts that is more apparent in Islam-oriented countries. This unexpected finding can be 
traceable to the facts that during the sampled periodicity, most conflicts in the world have 
been in the Middle East and North Africa owing the Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a; El-Haddad, 2020). Third, persistence in deaths from internal conflicts is more apparent 
in coastal countries vis-à-vis their landlocked counterparts. This may be explained by the 
tendency of globalization to drive conflicts, in which, coastal countries are more exposed. 
In Table 3, results in some sub-samples are not provided because of lack of degrees of 
freedom. First, from a regional perspective the following regions experience more persistence 
in deaths from internal conflict in the following increasing order of magnitude: Europe & 
Central Asia; East Asia & the Pacific; Latin America; sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Middle 
East & North Africa (MENA). Unfortunately, a comparative emphasis is not worthwhile in 
the light of the intuition in Section 2 because only the ‘Europe & Central Asia” sub-sample 
passes the post-estimation diagnostic test related to instrument proliferation. Second, French 
civil law countries experience more persistence in the deaths compared to their English 
common law counterparts. This is consistent with the narrative in Section 2.2. 
 As concerns determinants of persistence in the outcome variable, the following factors 
are broadly responsible for driving deaths from internal conflicts: homicides, conflict intensity 
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and conflicts fought. Conversely, the number of incarcerations deters deaths from internal 
conflicts and on average the sign of the UNPKF indicator cannot be established with certainty 






Table 2: Persistence in Internal Conflict with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Internal Conflict    
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  0.225*** -0.273 -0.928** -0.561 -
0.469*** 




 (0.000) (0.381) (0.038) (0.125) (0.000) (0.000) (0.765) (0.541) (0.672) (0.000) (0.721) (0.381) 





 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.560) (0.000) (0.528) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
0.0002 -0.032 0.070 -0.001 0.041 -
0.290*** 
0.375 0.157* -0.274 -0.083 0.023 -0.040 
 (0.586) (0.455) (0.238) (0.982) (0.231) (0.000) (0.130) (0.052) (0.688) (0.212) (0.752) (0.663) 
Homicides   0.0001 0.041 0.185** -0.170 0.006 0.060** -0.175 -0.239 -0.291 0.159**
* 
-0.061 -0.016 
 (0.900) (0.463) (0.013) (0.163) (0.774) (0.027) (0.708) (0.217) (0.718) (0.004) (0.624) (0.885) 




-0.243 -0.010 0.050 0.198**
* 
-0.061 -0.089 
 (0.089) (0.195) (0.000) (0.001) (0.157) (0.006) (0.317) (0.867) (0.870) (0.000) (0.484) (0.334) 





 (0.903) (0.000) (0.000) (0.263) (0.049) (0.000) (0.126) (0.000) (0.792) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Conflict Fought  0.0001 0.617*** 0.144*** 0.172 0.421*** -
0.143*** 
-0.030 0.091 -0.154 0.268**
* 
0.077 0.226*** 
 (0.757) (0.000) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.004) (0.979) (0.290) (0.937) (0.00) (0.311) (0.000) 
UNPKF  -0.0001 -0.023 0.078** 0.015 0.004 -0.033 -0.051 0.056 0.015 -0.030* 0.054** 0.032 
 (0.723) (0.123) (0.016) (0.476) (0.695) (0.125) (0.847) (0.118) (0.853) (0.067) (0.027) (0.168) 
             
AR(1) (0.117) (0.157) (0.038) (0.052) (0.329) (0.155) (0.221) (0.003) (0.504) (0.026) (0.015) (0.005) 
AR(2) (0.193) (0.290) (0.581) (0.054) (0.390) (0.304) (0.552) (0.193) (0.812) (0.043) (0.550) (0.453) 
Sargan OIR (0.003) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.995) (0.865) (0.447) (0.465) (0.347) (0.508) (1.000) (0.660) (1.000) (0.359) (0.737) (0.479) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.664) (0.600) (0.631) (0.118) (0.588) (0.895) (0.986) (0.323) (0.972) (0.566) (0.598) (0.348) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.999) (0.851) (0.319) (0.794) (0.241) (0.251) (1.000) (0.774) (1.000) (0.262) (0.679) (0.532) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.975) (0.680) (0.867) (0.746) (0.617) (0.797) (1.000) (0.728) (1.000) (0.353) (0.707) (0.399) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.973) (0.976) (0.041) (0.099) (0.091) (0.097) (1.000) (0.328) (0.986) (0.385) (0.534) (0.573) 




772.5*** 31.66*** 86.69*** 47.37*** 3007*** 44.51**
* 
47.95*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245 65 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of  the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR 
tests. HI: High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Lower Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian 
countries with Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from 
Catholicism and Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Bhuddism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not 









Table 3: Persistence in Internal Conflict with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent variable: Internal Conflict   
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  na 0.552** 0.035 -1.316 -0.311 -0.204  -1.235*** -0.619 0.488***   -0.336 
  (0.038) (0.887) (0.174) (0.407) (0.639)  (0.001) (0.148) (0.001)   (0.381) 
Internal Conflict  (-
1) 
 0.453*** 0.596*** 0.808*** 0.719*** 0.680***  0.668*** 0.736*** 1.512***   0.742*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
 0.044 0.0006 -0.112 -0.025 0.052  0.132** -0.121 -0.0005   -0.040 
  (0.260) (0.993) (0.558) (0.703) (0.158)  (0.023) (0.135) (0.934)   (0.663) 
Homicides    -0.102*** -0.004 0.348 -0.117 0.028  0.118* 0.121 0.0004   -0.016 
  (0.000) (0.937) (0.186) (0.324) (0.613)  (0.078) (0.341) (0.947)   (0.885) 
Incarcerations     -0.039** -0.017 0.177 -0.028 -0.009  0.084 -0.093 0.0003   -0.089 
  (0.033) (0.788) (0.396) (0.884) (0.885)  (0.256) (0.331) (0.951)   (0.334) 
Conflict Intensity    0.201*** -0.034 0.395*** 0.301*** -0.072  0.315*** 0.331*** -0.0004   0.286*** 
  (0.000) (0.509) (0.003) (0.006) (0.286)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.916)   (0.000) 
Conflict Fought   -0.032 0.436** -0.134 0.242*** 0.401***  0.113** 0.240*** -
1.000*** 
  0.226*** 
  (0.899) (0.021) (0.282) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.032) (0.001) (0.000)   (0.000) 
UNPKF   -0.072*** 0.004 0.010 0.026 0.011  -0.012 0.031 0.0002   0.032 
  (0.000) (0.651) (0.871) (0.314) (0.673)  (0.566) (0.326) (0.916)   (0.168) 
              
AR(1)  (0.016) (0.121) (0.065) (0.148) (0.409)  (0.108) (0.031) (0.338)   (0.005) 
AR(2)  (0.217) (0.103) (0.179) (0.504) (0.276)  (0.243) (0.756) (0.336)   (0.453) 
Sargan OIR  (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)   (0.000) 





             
H excluding group  (0.201) (0.482) (0.469) (0.894) (0.957)  (0.797) (0.241) (0.981)   (0.348) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.832) (1.000) (1.000) (0.280) (0.987)  (0.055) (0.282) (1.000)   (0.532) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H excluding 
group 
 (0.401) (0.971) (0.771) (0.385) (0.989)  (0.112) (0.224) (1.000)   (0.399) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.911) (0.988) (1.000) (0.778) (0.969)  (0.515) (0.333) (1.000)   (0.573) 
Fisher  289.49*** 437.15*** 1146*** 129.27*** 4471***  212.66*** 37.7*** 1910***   47.95*** 
Instruments  31 31 31 31 31  31 31 30   31 
Countries   48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations   240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of  the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR 
tests. ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. NA: 
North America. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries.  Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.   
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results  
 Before the findings are discussed further, it is relevant to provide more insights into 
the concept of convergence underlying the determination of persistence. The analysis is a 
form of conditional convergence because a conditioning information set is used in the 
modelling exercise (Asongu, 2013). This is contrary to the absolute convergence modelling 
framework in which only the lagged dependent variable features as an independent variable. 
Conditional convergence is the type of convergence that shows decreasing dispersions 
towards a country’s own long term equilibrium or steady state (Barro, 1991; Prichett, 1997; 
Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012). Hence, the conditional approach to convergence is 
contingent on characteristics that determine cross-country differences in the outcome variable. 
In the same vein, in the light of the established findings, the leading roles of the Islam-
dominated countries  (compared to Christian-oriented countries) and French civil law 
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countries (vis-à-vis English common law countries), are fundamentally traceable to conflict 
intensity and conflicts fought (which constitute variables or determinants in the conditioning 
information set). In what follows we provide some explanations to the established tendencies. 
The leading role of the Islam-dominated countries in driving deaths from internal 
conflicts is consistent with events in the post-“2011 Arab Spring” on the one hand and 
periodicity of the study on the other. With respect to the latter, the periodicity employed in 
this study broadly aligns with the beginning of the Arab Spring. Concerning post-“2011 Arab 
Spring” events, the conflicts in the MENA have dominated media spotlights since the 
overthrow of the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Some features in the MENA that 
have contributed to the deaths from internal conflicts include: (i) the failed Libyan state in the 
post-Gaddafi era, in which various rebel factions are fighting to take decisions on the 
country’s destiny and determine the law of the land; (ii)  the scenario in Yemen which is 
deteriorating because of a proxy war largely being fought by Iran and Saudi Arabia who are in 
support of opposition rebel factions and (iii) the war in Syria which has generated fragile 
politico-economic environments in neighboring countries (e.g. Iraq and Lebanon), for the 
most part because of the birth of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Since MENA 
countries are Islam-dominated; the narrative above also partly explains why Islam-dominated 
countries reflect more persistence in deaths from civil conflicts vis-à-vis their Christian-
oriented counterparts.  
 The comparative persistence of French civil law countries vis-à-vis English common 
law countries can be elicited by the fact that French civil law countries are traditionally less 
flexible to adapt to evolving and changing environments (Agbor, 2015, Beck et al., 2003;   La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999).  In the light of this insight, the English common law system has 
advantages from  the political and adaptability channels (Beck et al., 2013). According to 
political channel, English common law systems prioritize the rights of individuals instead of 
the power of the State. With respect to the adaptability mechanism, French civil law countries 
adapt less to changing circumstances. Therefore, the English common law system is more 
likely to provide enabling socio-economic and legal conditions that mitigate the hysteresis 
hypothesis in deaths from conflicts, notably: past observations in deaths from conflicts 
influencing future observations from deaths in conflicts. Let us substantiate this perspective 
with the example of SSA which eloquently represents both English common law and French 
civil law countries. Accordingly, in the post-colonial époque, as of 2014, former French 
colonies had registered more than half of all documented political coup d’états in Africa, 
notably: 45 versus 22 for English common law countries (Koutonin, 2014). These political 
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coup d’états are often surrounded by civil wars and political strife that substantially lead to 
deaths.  
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
We investigate persistence and determinants of deaths from conflicts around the world using a 
sample of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on 
Generalised Method of Moments. In order to increase room for policy implications the dataset 
is decomposed into fundamentals based on income levels, legal origins, religious domination, 
landlockedness and regional proximity. First, the deaths from internal conflicts are more 
persistent in: (i) high income countries compared to low income countries on the one hand 
and on the other hand, in lower middle income countries compared to their upper middle 
income counterparts. Second, the persistence of deaths from internal conflict is more apparent 
in coastal, French civil-law and Islam-oriented countries, compared to landlocked, English 
common law, Christian-oriented countries, respectively. Third, with regard to determinants of 
persistence, the following factors are significantly responsible for driving deaths from internal 
conflicts: homicides, conflict intensity and conflict fought. Furthermore, incarcerations have 
negative effects. Justifications for the established tendencies have been discussed.   
 The findings have implications for, inter alia:  foreign aid, foreign investment and 
tourism location decisions. Accordingly, given that public spending is often not sufficient in 
developing countries in order to prevent and mitigate deaths from conflicts (especially those 
associated with terrorism), the allocation foreign aid to developing countries for the purpose 
of preventing human causalities from conflicts should prioritize regions (and by extension 
counties) which reflect the highest levels of persistence. In the same vein, tourists’ arrivals 
and the location decisions of some types foreign direct investments (especially those related to 
the high traffic of individuals) are most likely to be influenced by evidence of how past deaths 
from conflicts will influence future deaths from the same cause.  
It is also important note that the established persistence is contingent on the adopted 
determinants which we have integrated into the models and empirically tested. Future studies 
can improve the extant literature by focusing on country-specific studies for more targeted 
policy implications.   
 
6. Conflict of interest statement  





Table 4: Persistence in External Conflicts with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: External Conflicts  
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 





 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.396) (0.000) (0.363) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 






1.169 -0.029 0.349 -0.079 
*** 
-0.071* -0.061* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.702) (0.000) (0.127) (0.146) (0.626) (0.000) (0.085) (0.050) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
-0.026 -0.003 -0.049* 0.060 -0.055** 0.303*** 0.063 0.010 -0.043 -0.0006 -0.075* -0.051 
 (0.197) (0.867) (0.098) (0.258) (0.026) (0.003) (0.564) (0.800) (0.889) (0.988) (0.068) (0.112) 
Homicides   0.009 0.016 -0.072 0.015 -0.024* -0.035 0.192 0.083** -0.0005 -
0.037** 
-0.021 -0.006 
 (0.835) (0.328) (0.231) (0.654) (0.087) (0.424) (0.271) (0.011) (0.998) (0.042) (0.709) (0.862) 
Incarcerations    0.132** -
0.057*** 
-0.083 0.135** 0.008 -0.132 -0.178 -0.021* -0.086 -0.092 -0.016 0.020 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.105) (0.029) (0.744) (0.323) (0.215) (0.068) (0.848) (0.231) (0.737) (0.650) 




-0.023* 0.004 0.211 0.0002 -0.0004 0.039 -0.038 0.0007 
 (0.707) (0.001) (0.200) (0.003) (0.058) (0.962) (0.207) (0.993) (0.997) (0.143) (0.239) (0.979) 
Conflict Fought  0.126** -0.024** 0.008 0.003 0.013 0.012 -0.051 -0.027* -0.152 0.012 -0.031 -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.684) (0.880) (0.448) (0.801) (0.785) (0.065) (0.557) (0.505) (0.497) (0.653) 
UNPKF  -0.028 -0.006 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.042*** 0.243 -0.0001 0.103 0.031** 0.004 0.017 
 (0.215) (0.247) (0.724) (0.146) (0.561) (0.004) (0.165) (0.991) (0.451) (0.035) (0.782) (0.116) 
             
AR(1) (0.022) (0.839) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071) (0.959) (0.265) (0.995) (0.670) (0.381) (0.886) (0.434) 
AR(2) (0.028) (0.197) (0.055) (0.100) (0.016) (0.026) (0.302) (0.090) (0.194) (0.065) (0.001) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.649) (0.000) (0.017) (0.984) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.976) (0.010) (0.022) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.445) (0.984) (0.466) (0.775) (0.711) (0.674) (1.000) (0.957) (1.000) (0.708) (0.853) (0.773) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.191) (0.625) (0.302) (0.626) (0.227) (0.550) (0.941) (0.382) (1.000) (0.355) (0.563) (0.373) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.655) (0.992) (0.557) (0.713) (0.901) (0.628) (1.000) (0.996) (1.000) (0.803) (0.853) (0.861) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.360) (0.961) (0.535) (0.737) (0.588) (0.569) (1.000) (0.950) (1.000) (0.654) (0.807) (0.780) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.583) (0.842) (0.290) (0.572) (0.737) (0.679) (1.000) (0.630) (1.000) (0.573) (0.643) (0.466) 
Fisher 508.68*** 13.31*** 8.77*** 8.83*** 2.63*** 96.75*** 18.05*** 3.04*** 4.85*** 89.46**
* 
4.82*** 3.66*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245 64 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR 
tests. HI: High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Lower Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian 
countries with Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from 
Catholicism and Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Bhuddism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not 



















Table 5: Persistence in external conflicts with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent variable: External Conflicts    
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  na 0.534*** 0.642** 1.136** 0.789*** 1.046*** na 1.028** 1.321*** 1.055*** na na 1.229*** 
  (0.004) (0.039) (0.024) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.046) (0.000) (0.001)   (0.000) 
External Conflicts    (-
1) 




0.006 0.011   -0.061* 
  (0.066) (0.007) (0.901) (0.000) (0.969)  (0.000) (0.870) (0.902)   (0.050) 




-0.001 -0.063 0.063 -0.002  0.038 -0.059** -0.033   -0.051 
  (0.001) (0.989) (0.620) (0.294) (0.834)  (0.466) (0.017) (0.318)   (0.112) 
Homicides    -0.004 0.014 0.070 -0.018 0.0003  0.050 -0.029 0.011   -0.006 
  (0.839) (0.940) (0.830) (0.645) (0.987)  (0.468) (0.400) (0.851)   (0.862) 
Incarcerations     0.0001 -0.015 0.045 0.118 0.0004  -0.027 -0.011 0.021   0.020 
  (0.986) (0.957) (0.568) (0.349) (0.984)  (0.780) (0.678) (0.593)   (0.650) 
Conflict Intensity    -0.004 -0.068 -0.022 -0.036 -0.004  -0.032 -0.019 -0.006   0.0007 
  (0.810) (0.485) (0.782) (0.422) (0.789)  (0.601) (0.521) (0.745)   (0.979) 
Conflict Fought   0.582*** 0.046 -0.013 0.020 0.0004  -0.012 0.020 -0.010   -0.012 
  (0.000) (0.779) (0.804) (0.316) (0.971)  (0.766) (0.285) (0.923)   (0.653) 
UNPKF   0.012 0.028 -0.001 0.018* -0.0001  0.017 0.004 -0.004   0.017 
  (0.406) (0.524) (0.986) (0.072) (0.982)  (0.551) (0.670) (0.697)   (0.116) 
              
AR(1)  (0.046) (0.081) (0.830) (0.223) (0.967)  (0.325) (0.187) (0.048)   (0.434) 
AR(2)  (0.017) (0.087) (0.750) (0.130) (0.964)  (0.022) (0.027) (0.156)   (0.000) 
Sargan OIR  (0.232) (0.976) (0.067) (0.007) (1.000)  (0.000) (0.909) (0.834)   (0.001) 
Hansen OIR  (0.363) (0.999) (0.996) (0.968) (1.000)  (0.746) (0.896) (0.989)   (0.773) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
             
H excluding group  (0.593) (0.387) (0.570) (0.504) (0.871)  (0.117) (0.549) (0.462)   (0.373) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.254) (1.000) (1.000) (0.991) (1.000)  (0.985) (0.913) (1.000)   (0.861) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
 (0.255) (0.982) (0.982) (0.914) (1.000)  (0.550) (0.969) (0.941)   (0.780) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.665) (1.000) (0.960) (0.900) (0.999)  (0.917) (0.267) (0.994)   (0.466) 
Fisher  21.61*** 103.6*** 1.68 25.93*** 1.27  17.87*** 1.96** 1.13   3.66*** 
Instruments  31 31 31 31 31  31 31 31   31 
Countries   48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations   240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR 
tests. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law countries. 
Social: Socialists countries.  ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: 
























Appendix 1: Definitions of variables and presentation of countries  
  
Panel A: Variables 
Variables  Definitions and sources  of variables  
  
Deaths from internal 
conflict  
Number of deaths from organised conflict (internal)International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD) 
  
Deaths from external 
conflict 
Number of deaths from organised conflict (external) 
UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
£  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Intensity of internal 
conflict  
Intensity of organised internal conflict 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Internal conflicts fought Number and duration of internal conflicts 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-
State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics 




Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions 
United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP 
  
Panel B: Presentation of countries (163) 
 
“Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; 
Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; 
New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua 
New Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe”. 
  
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. EIU: Economic Intelligence Unit. UNHCR: United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. IISS: The International Institute for 
















Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
      
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Deaths from internal conflict  1.405 0.933 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Deaths from external conflict 1.105 0.335 1.000 3.371 978 
      
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Homicides  2.797 1.154 1.103 5.000 978   
£      
Incarceration  2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Intensity of internal conflict  2.412 1.162 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Internal conflicts fought 1.458 1.024 1.000 5.000 977 
      
United Nations Peacekeeping 
Funding. 
2.291 1.164 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Standard dev: Standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size:  977) 
         
S O & P Homicides Incar IIC ICF UNPKF DFIC DREC  
1.000 -0.022 0.279 0.063 -0.092 0.0002 0.030 -0.169 S O & P 
 1.000 0.162 0.296 0.184 0.305 0.170 -0.141 Homicides 
  1.000 -0.082 -0.168 -0.172 -0.142 0.066 Incar 
   1.000 0.528 0.301 0.542 -0.012 IIC 
    1.000 0.132 0.787 0.100 ICF 
     1.000 0.093 -0.147 UNPKF 
      1.000 0.033 DFIC 
       1.000 DREC 
         
S O & P: Security Officers & Police. Incar: Incarcerations. IIC: Intensity of Internal Conflict. ICF: Internal Conflict Fought. 
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